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The	  move	  from	  territorial	  defence	  to	  ‘wars	  of	  choice’	  has	  influenced	  the	  domestic	  politics	  of	  
military	  interventions.	  This	  paper	  examines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  both	  the	  substance	  and	  the	  
procedure	   of	   military	   interventions	   are	   contested	   among	   political	   parties.	   Regarding	   the	  
substance,	  our	  analysis	  of	  Chapel	  Hill	  Expert	  Survey	  data	  demonstrates	  that	  across	  European	  
states	  political	  parties	  on	  the	  right	  are	  more	  supportive	  of	  military	  missions	  than	  those	  on	  the	  
left.	  On	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedures,	  our	  case	  studies	  of	  Germany,	  France,	  Spain	  and	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  show	  that	  political	  parties	  on	  the	   left	   tend	  to	   favour	  strong	  parliamentary	  
control	  whereas	  those	  on	  the	  right	  tend	  to	  prefer	  an	  unconstrained	  executive,	  although	  with	  
differences	   across	   countries.	   These	   findings	   challenge	   the	   view	   that	   ‘politics	   stops	   at	   the	  
water’s	   edge’	   and	   contribute	   to	   a	   greater	   understanding	   of	   how	   political	   parties	   and	  
parliaments	  influence	  military	  interventions.	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Introduction 
 
Throughout Europe, the move from territorial defence to ‘wars of choice’ (Freedman 2005: 
98) has influenced the domestic politics of military interventions. With the survival of the 
state not at threat, the political and procedural legitimacy of waging wars of choice may 
develop as the centre stage of domestic political contestation. This contestation can occur in 
the general public, as leaders need to make their case for the legitimacy of the use of force. 
But contestation may also occur surrounding the typically strong executive prerogatives in 
engaging armed force, and the role that parliaments have in constraining executives.   
Political parties sit at the centre of this contestation as they represent the public in the 
general political debate and the parliament in executive-legislative relations. Although 
scholarship discussing party positions on specific missions and/or individual countries is 
abundant (e.g. Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016; Strong 2014; Rathbun 2004), there is very little 
systematic and comparative analysis of party political preferences on the use of force and 
legislative-executive relations in security policies. In this article, we examine the extent to 
which both the substance and the procedure of military interventions have been contested 
among political parties. Using quantitative and qualitative evidence, we show that the 
left/right axis captures the differences across political parties on both dimensions, although 
the national context partially qualifies the effect of party politics.   
The article proceeds in four steps. Section one reviews various explanations for why 
political parties disagree about military interventions rather than sharing a cross-party notion 
of the ‘national interest’. It presents alternative propositions on the main axes of political 
contestation. Section two examines the plausibility of these expectations by analysing data 
from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positioning, which covers parties from 28 
European countries (Bakker et al. 2015). Section three turns to the politics of legislative-
executive relations in decision-making procedures on the use of armed force by examining the 
party politics of legislative-executive relations in Germany, Spain, France and the United 
Kingdom (UK) in depth. These four countries have played important roles in military 
missions but represent different constitutional traditions and political-strategic cultures. The 
final section recaps the main findings and argues further that despite the country-specific 
differences, the domestic politics of military interventions cannot be fully explained without 
taking into account the effect of party politics along a left/right axis. Overall, this article 
argues that, contrary to the commonly held assumption that ‘politics stops at the water’s 
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edge’, the role of parliaments in foreign policy (the subject of this Special Issue) is very much 
a point of ideological contestation among political parties. 
 
The Party Politics of Military Missions 
 
Political parties emerged in response to social conflict (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In most 
democracies, cultural cleavages have been less influential than a socio-economic one that has 
pitted leftist against rightist parties. The former are characterized as more –‘inclusive’, 
‘egalitarian’ and as having sympathies for a strong role for the state in the economy. The 
opposite holds for rightist parties. Subsequent social conflicts, e.g. over the environment, have 
mostly been accommodated by existing cleavages (Kriesi et al. 2006). The left/right typology 
has also been used to characterize foreign policy positions, despite the assumption in much 
International Relations scholarship that domestic actors, such as political parties, have a 
consensus on one national interest. Left parties are considered to be ‘dovish’ in contrast to 
‘hawkish’ right parties. Such general profiles are confirmed in studies of election manifestos. 
Klingemann et al. (1994), for example, find that right parties are considered to be ‘pro-
military’ whereas left parties are ‘anti-military’ and ‘pro-peace’. However, when it comes to 
the actual propensity to use armed force abroad, the literature is less conclusive. 
Students of political parties and security policy have suggested three rationales for 
why political parties differ on military missions. First, foreign policies may impact domestic 
policy programs because they compete for the same resources. For this reason, Koch and 
Sullivan (2010: 619) argue that parties that promote the welfare state tend to oppose large 
armies, expensive military procurement as well as the actual use of armed force abroad.  
Second, political parties may have genuine foreign policy differences that have no 
discernible link to domestic politics. For example, Brian Rathbun (2004: 19) argues that some 
parties believe in what Robert Jervis called the ‘deterrence’ model of international politics 
whereas others subscribe to what he dubbed the ‘spiral’ model. According to the former, 
interests are best guarded by military strength and resolve; in contrast, the latter stresses 
empathy and ‘security dilemma sensitivity’ (Jervis 1976). Whereas the former translates into 
more ‘hawkish’ policies, the latter implies more ‘dovish’ ones. 
Third, foreign policies may result from the same core values and principled beliefs 
that also inspire domestic policies. Rathbun suggests that liberty and equality are such core 
values and that ‘partisan debates can generally be reduced to fundamental disputes about the 
importance of equality and liberty, whether at home or abroad’ (2004: 2). For example, 
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parties emphasizing equality are concerned about minorities and the underprivileged and thus 
favour the welfare state as well as interventions on behalf of minorities and underprivileged 
abroad.  
The expectations of the three rationales are therefore partly conflicting. Whereas the 
first two rationales suggest support for military missions to be stronger among right parties 
than left parties, the third rationale adds an important qualification: if force is used for 
humanitarian purpose, rather than self-defence, left parties may be more supportive than right 
parties (cf. Born and Hänggi 2005: 11). Anecdotal evidence includes the interventionism of 
Bill Clinton’s Democrats as well as Tony Blair’s Labour Party.  
At the same time, previous research on the influence of a government’s left/right 
orientation on the propensity to use military force has proceeded on the assumption that the 
relation would be linear (see, for example, Palmer et al. 2004). However, it is not obvious that 
a far right political party would be more supportive of military missions than a conservative 
or Christian-Democratic party. The former may score higher on a general preparedness to use 
military force but it may also be more hesitant to use such force for any goal other than 
territorial defence (see the country studies in Liang 2007).  
Finally, ‘wars of choice’ may even transcend the left/right logic entirely. If military 
force is purportedly used to ‘save strangers’ (Wheeler 2000) from state-sponsored violence 
(as in Kosovo 1999 and in Libya 2011), to topple a dictatorship (as in Iraq in 2003) or to 
support a state and nation-building process (as in Afghanistan from 2001 on), the 
justifications resonate with ‘post-materialist’ values that are characteristic of a cultural 
cleavage, rather than the socio-economic one. In exploring this alternative hypothesis, we 
make use of the new politics dimension, conceptualized by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and 
Carole Wilson (2002) that ranges from ‘green/alternative/libertarian’ (GAL) to 
‘traditional/authoritarian/nationalist’ (TAN) party positions. For example, this GAL/TAN 
scale is found to capture the structure of contestation on European integration better than the 
traditional left-right scale (Ibid).  In	   sum,	   although	  previous	   research	  has	   addressed	   the	   ideological	  dimension	  of	  political	  parties’	  positions	  on	  interventions,	  theoretical	  expectations	  about	  the	  effect	  of	  party-­‐political	  cleavages	  differ	  and	  there	  are	  few	  cross-­‐country	  systematic	  comparisons.	  	  	  	  A	   broader	   investigation	   is	   necessary	   to	   assess	   the	   different	   rationales	   for	   parties’	  positions	   on	   military	   interventions,	   as	   modern	   ‚wars	   of	   choice’	   complicate	   parties’	  positioning	  on	  these	  choices. 
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Mapping Political Parties’ Positions on Military Missions 
 
The positions of political parties have been studied and coded in a series of datasets. The most 
widely used dataset is provided by the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2015). Even though 
this dataset includes variables to code parties’ positions on ‘the military’, ‘peace’ and 
‘internationalism’, it does not include a measure of whether parties support their country’s 
participation in military missions. In contrast, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) included 
such a question in its 2010 survey.1 In that round, more than 1.000 experts were asked to 
place 237 political parties from 28 European states2 on various issues and ideological 
dimensions.3  
In this section, we use the data collected by the CHES to map the position of political 
parties on military missions and to correlate them with their value on a left/right scale, on the 
one hand, and on a GAL/TAN scale, on the other hand.4 In addition, we draw on the notion of 
party families to cluster parties into groups with shared core values and interests and to 
examine whether there are significant differences across party families. However, not all party 
families are of equal weight, especially not in the countries we study in more depth. For the 
subsequent analysis, therefore, we exclude the ‘Confessional/Protestant’, ‘Agrarian’ and 
‘Regionalist/Ethnic’ party families as well as all parties that are coded as not belonging to any 
family. Furthermore, we merged the party families ‘Conservatives’ and ‘Christian Democrats’ 
into one category because they occupy comparable positions on both the left-right scale as 
well as on military missions and they do not compete with each other in any of the countries 
studied in depth below. For most parts of our analysis, therefore, we zoom in on the 
differences between the main party families, namely Conservatives/Christian Democrats, 
Socialists, Liberals, Greens, Radical Left and Radical Right.  
Figures 1 and 2 visualize the correlation between political parties’ support for peace 
and security missions and their position on a left/right and a GAL/TAN axis respectively. 
Showing the positions of 237 political parties in 28 European countries, the scatterplots 
demonstrate that peace and security missions are highly contested. Considerable numbers of 
parties can be found amongst the supporters (6 and above on the y-axis) as well as amongst 
the opponents (4 and below on the y-axis). In both cases, the correlations are curvilinear.5  
With a view to the left/right axis, support for peace and security missions is lowest at 
the far left. It grows as one moves to the centre-left and reaches its peak at the centre right. 
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Support then declines again as one moves to the far right, although this support is higher than 
at the far left.  
 
FIGURE 1 
MAPPING OF POLITICAL PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON MILITARY MISSIONS ON A LEFT/RIGHT-SCALE 
(WITH 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 	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FIGURE 2 MAPPING	  OF	  POLITICAL	  PARTIES’	  POSITIONS	  ON	  MILITARY	  MISSIONS	  ON	  A	  GAL/TAN-­‐SCALE	  (WITH	  95%	  CONFIDENCE	  INTERVALS)	  
 
	  	  p	  =	  0.000	  
 
Figure 2 shows that the correlation between support for military missions and a party’s 
position on the GAL/TAN axis is also curvilinear, i.e. support is highest at the centre and 
declines towards both ends. In other words, both political parties that are very 
green/alternative/libertarian and those that are very traditional/authoritarian/nationalist tend to 
oppose peace and security missions.   
Although both correlations are statistically significant at the 0,001 level, the left/right 
variable can explain a higher share in the variation among political parties’ positions on peace 
and security missions: r2 for left/right is 0,43 compared to 0,12 for GAL/TAN. Furthermore, 
even though the GAL/TAN axis is significantly correlated to parties’ positions on military 
missions, the curvilinear relation does not confirm the theoretical expectations outlined above: 
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Parties were expected to be the more supportive of using force to ‘save strangers’ the more 
they are green/alternative/libertarian. Instead, the CHES data suggest that high scores on GAL 
tend to correspond with low support for military missions. From a theoretical point, it is 
unclear why support for a new use of military force is highest among political parties that 
occupy a neutral position on a scale that is designed to capture contestation over new politics 
issues.   
	   FIGURE	  3	  BOXPLOT	  OF	  PARTY	  FAMILIES’	  SUPPORT	  FOR	  PEACE	  AND	  SECURITY	  MISSIONS	  
 
	  	  
Figure 3 and Table 1 examine differences in support for military missions across the 
main party families. As the boxplot visualizes and the ANOVA analysis demonstrates, party 
families differ in the degree to which they are in favour of their country participating in peace 
and security missions: Conservatives/Christian Democrats and Liberal parties are most 
supportive whereas support is lowest among political parties of the Radical Left, followed by 
Green and Radical Right parties. As a party family, the Social Democrats are split right in the 
middle with supporters and opponents of roughly equal strength. 
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 TABLE	  1	  ANOVA	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  SUPPORT	  FOR	  PEACE	  AND	  SECURITY	  MISSIONS	  ACROSS	  PARTY	  FAMILIES	  
	  Family	   N	   Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Radical	  Right	   19	   4.246 1.5880 1.8 7.4 Conservatives	  and	  Christian	  Democrats	   45	   6.063 1.2211 2.8 8.3 Liberal	   34	   5.898 .9377 4.4 7.9 Socialist	   29	   5.207 1.3279 2.3 7.1 Radical	  Left	   19	   2.551 1.0317 .9 4.6 Green	   15	   3.857 .9685 2.1 5.5 p=0.000	  
 
Taken together, political parties differ widely in their support for military missions. By and 
large, such differences can be well captured by the established left/right dimension. However, 
the correlation is curvilinear: support increases as one moves along the axis from left to right 
but decreases again as one nears the radical right end the spectrum. Of course, the CHES data 
do not allow us to determine whether differences in supporting military missions stem from 
the expected impact on domestic policy programs or from genuine beliefs about foreign and 
security policy, but they nevertheless clearly show the divide between party families. 
  
Recalibrating Legislative-Executive Relations in Decision-making on the Use of Force 
 
Given our findings that political parties systematically differ in their support for military 
missions, we now examine to what extent such preferences about policy translate into 
preferences about procedure, namely the role of parliament in deployment decisions. The 
notion that support for a strong parliamentary involvement in deployment decisions first and 
foremost comes from opponents of military missions seems intuitively plausible. It is also in 
line with research in conflict studies according to which parliaments have a constraining 
effect on the use of force (Russett 1993: 38; Dieterich et al. 2015). However, explanations of 
parliament’s role in deployment decisions have thus far ignored a party-political dimension 
and instead emphasized country-specific factors such as constitutional traditions, historical 
experiences and the security environment (Peters and Wagner 2014). For parties on the 
radical right in particular, constitutional preferences for a strong executive conflict with the 
instrumental support of parliament to constrain the deployment of troops. What is more, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that institutional self-interest may trump principled 
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considerations. US President Obama, for example, turned from a critic of Presidential 
authorization of force during his 2007 election campaign to an advocate once in the White 
House (Fisher 2012). Parties may thus similarly stand for a stronger parliament, regardless of 
their substantive positions on military missions. Finally, of course, a political party’s position 
on specific procedural reforms may be influenced by being in government or in opposition. 
This section examines the party politics of legislative-executive relations in decision-
making on the use of force in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. These four 
European members of NATO have played important roles in recent military interventions and 
represent different constitutional traditions, systems of government and political-strategic 
cultures. As described in much detail elsewhere (see Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017, Ostermann  
2017 as well as Wagner et al. 2010), the role of parliament in decision-making on the use of 
force has been subject to debate and change in all four countries. Our aim in this section is to 
examine to what extent these debates were characterized by a party-political cleavage that 
pitted proponents of parliamentary scrutiny and control on the left against advocates of 
executive discretion on the right (appendix 1 provides an overview of the political parties, 
their vote share and their position on peace and security missions, as reported in the CHES).  
Because party political contestation is often triggered by changes in the security 
environment or major military missions, the following section is structured around such major 
episodes. We first look into the debates triggered by the end of the Cold War and then discuss 
the aftermath of the intervention in Kosovo and, even more importantly, the 2003 Iraq War. It 
is important to note, however, that the effects of such events were felt unevenly across these 
four states. The Iraq war, in particular, triggered far more controversy over decision-making 
procedures in Spain and the UK, where governments decided to participate despite 
widespread public opposition, than in France and Germany whose governments had decided 
against participation. We therefore address the recalibration of legislative-executive relations 
in these four countries in historically defined, separate sub-sections.  
  
Parliamentary War Powers at the End of the Cold War and the Challenge of Missions ‘Out of 
Area’ 
In all four countries under study, the end of the Cold War put so-called 'wars of choice’ on the 
agenda. The US-led intervention in the Persian Gulf to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 
1991 was politically supported by all four countries, not the least because it had a clear 
mandate by the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, Germany’s policy of 
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using armed force only for (collective) self-defence was challenged by calls to make a 
military contribution to “Operation Desert Storm”.   
At the time of the 1991 Gulf War, none of the parliaments under study had the 
authority to participate in decision-making over such a military deployment. The German 
constitution required parliamentary approval for the use of force in case of an armed attack 
(“Verteidigungsfall”) but did not address UN-authorized military interventions. In a similar 
vein, the Spanish constitution required an authorization by parliament “to declare war and 
make peace”.6 However, ‘the prior authorisation of Parliament for the declaration of war has 
become an empty power since combat operations are routinely practiced without this 
formality’ (Cortino Hueso, 2003: 741). In the UK and in France, any deployment was 
considered the exclusive competence of the executive (referred to as “royal prerogative” in 
the UK and as “domaine réservé” in France), although the French constitution’s article 35 
also reserves the right to declare war to parliament. Nevertheless, French President Mitterrand 
decided to ask parliament for a vote in support of the French contribution, which took place 
on 16 January 1991, via the intermediary of a declaration of government which can be 
followed by a vote. However, it was commonly understood that this vote would not challenge 
the exclusive executive authority to decide military missions. 
 Amongst these four countries, the first major recalibration of legislative-executive 
relations in deployment decision-making took place in Germany. In the years following the 
1991 Gulf War, the lawfulness and the political expediency of different types of missions 
blended into a complex debate that was almost as controversial within as among political 
parties. A full review of this debate is beyond the confines of this paper (for a comprehensive 
overview see Harnisch 2006: 235ff.). What is worth highlighting here, however, is that 
positions on the role of parliament indeed reflected positions on the use of force and, 
notwithstanding intra-party controversies, support for military missions grew towards the 
right of the political spectrum (with the Radical Right absent from the debate). Thus, 
proposals to require approval by a super-majority of two-thirds of MPs were more prominent 
amongst Greens (Die Grünen) and Social Democrats (SPD) than amongst Christian 
Democrats (CDU-CSU) because the latter were more permissive as regards the deployment of 
the Bundeswehr out of area. The Radical Left (Die Linke) was staunchly opposed to any use 
of armed force except for self-defence and therefore refrained from addressing procedural 
issues. 
The 1994 Federal Constitutional Court ruling brought a preliminary end to this debate 
by declaring the deployment of the Bundeswehr ‘out of area’ constitutional. At the same time, 
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however, the Court referred to the Bundeswehr as a “parliamentary army” that may only be 
deployed after prior authorization by the Bundestag. The combination of granting the 
executive the competence to deploy armed forces in new ways, on the one hand, and 
procedurally constraining decisions to do so by introducing a parliamentary proviso, on the 
other hand, was crucial to build broad support for Germany’s new role in security and 
defence.  
The Constitutional Court left the task of spelling out the details in a deployment law to 
the Bundestag. During the drafting process, the party political controversy continued along 
the lines mentioned above: the Green party again suggested a two-thirds majority for peace-
enforcing missions. Proposals to enhance the executive’s room for manoeuvre by exempting 
multinational units under NATO or EU command from any parliamentary proviso were 
mostly made by Christian Democrats.7 The Liberals (FDP) took a middle position by 
suggesting establishing a special committee that could decide on behalf of parliament in case 
of small or special forces deployments. In December 2004, the deployment law was adopted 
against the votes of Christian Democrats, Liberals and the Radical Left.  
In neighbouring France, the developments in Germany were followed with great 
interest. After Mitterrand’s indirect vote on the Gulf War, the Vedel commission on 
constitutional change addressed issues of parliamentary powers in foreign policy for the first 
time, without resulting in constitutional changes though. The next major effort at reform was 
the report by the socialist MP François Lamy on the parliamentary control of military 
missions (and other defence-related issues, such as treaties, budgets etc. – Lamy 2000).8 
Lamy regretted parliament’s non-role in the policymaking on military operations. The large 
increase in number of these operations at the expense of classical inter-state war rendered the 
right of parliament to declare war futile (Ibid: 26ff., 58). Lamy deplored this state of affairs as 
intransparent and lacking legitimacy; it was strongly felt that parliamentary involvement 
could create this legitimacy (Ibid: 35). The socialist representative suggested a change of 
article 35 of the French constitution creating ‘the obligation for the executive to attain a prior 
opinion of parliament for every engagement of the French forces in operations abroad’ (Lamy 
2000: 60, emphasis added) excluding evacuation missions, and a prior ‘authorisation’ (Ibid: 
71) for all other missions without UN mandate or for those deriving from bilateral defence 
treaty obligations. The effort clearly aimed at reinstating strong parliamentary control in the 
‘original spirit’ (Ibid: 61) of the declaration of war powers. The report longed for multiple 
avenues of parliamentary commissions and control rights (such as in-theatre information 
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visits, regular ministerial auditions) and overall for more participation of the sovereign’s 
representative.  
 Whereas the political left followed the argumentation of its rapporteur (cf. Lamy 
2000: 78ff.), especially the right wing of parliament criticized the Lamy report’s far-fetching 
deviation from basic working principles of the Fifth Republic: dispositions entailing a prior 
authorisation from parliament à l’allemande were considered a too strong constraint on swift 
action by the executive. The right further feared the revelation of top-secret information to the 
enemy. Conversely, the Communists even wanted to extend the authorisation to all sorts of 
missions (Ibid: 81). Hence, the right way and the extent of parliamentary control were 
fundamentally contested, with the centre left aiming at stronger means of control than the 
right, and the far-left wanting to change the principle of executive prerogative completely. 
 Neither the UK nor Spain saw significant debates about a reform of deployment 
decision-making before the Kosovo War of 1999. In contrast, France and especially Germany 
experienced vivid debates about the role of parliament in decisions on the use of force. In line 
with our expectation that preferences over procedure result from preferences over policy, left 
parties in both countries were the main demandeurs of stronger parliamentary involvement 
whereas parties on the right voiced concerns about the executive’s ability to effectively 
deploy troops. 
 
The Shadow of Iraq and the Party Politics of Legislative-Executive Relations  
After several years in which troops were deployed to rather uncontroversial peace-keeping 
missions, NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign and the 2003 Iraq war were highly controversial 
operations. In those countries that participated in the Iraq war despite strong public 
opposition, the intervention was followed by discussions about parliament’s role in 
deployment decision-making. Particularly in the British case, these debates have been well 
documented elsewhere (see Strong 2014; Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017; Mello 2017). However, 
whereas most accounts treat the legislative and the executive as largely unitary actors, we pay 
special attention to the party-political dimension of these debates.  
In Spain, debates about a new deployment law began already in the wake of NATO’s 
1999 bombing campaign against Serbian targets in Kosovo and Serbia. In contrast to the Gulf 
War and several peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions since, the “Kosovo 
campaign” lacked a firm mandate by the UN Security Council and thus had a weak 
legitimization under international law. The Radical Left (IU), which was categorically 
opposed to the NATO operation, started requesting the need for parliamentary authorization. 
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The Socialists (PSOE) did not go as far as to defend a fully-fledged authorization procedure, 
but shared the criticism on the government’s neglect of the parliament in defence matters 
(Congreso de los Diputados 1999). 
However, it was the 2003 Iraq War that led all parties in opposition to request a new 
Law on National Defence with stronger involvement by parliament. Since the start of the US 
military strike on Iraq in March 2003, the left-wing opposition had repeatedly demanded that 
in any case where the deployment of Spanish troops to Iraq was being considered, parliament 
would be consulted, given the exceptional nature of the operation – a military intervention 
that did not have the support of the UN and that had divided the EU. However, in July 2003 
the PP government deployed 1.200 soldiers to Iraq without prior debate in parliament.9 The 
opposition strongly condemned this decision, accusing the government of having involved 
Spain in an illegal war against the wishes of parliament, and in the run-up to the March 2004 
parliamentary election, the leader of the Socialists, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, committed 
to revaluate the role of parliament in foreign military operations if he were to become the next 
Prime Minister (PM). 
In the convoluted context created by the Iraq fiasco and the ensuing terrorist attacks in 
Madrid in March 2004, the PSOE won the election and launched the approval of a new 
Organic Law on National Defence.10 Besides the requirement for ex-ante consultation and 
authorisation of troop dispatches,11 the new law made it mandatory to hold an annual 
parliamentary debate about the development of international operations and laid down a series 
of conditions with which foreign missions must comply (e.g. previous approval by the UN or 
other international organisations in which Spain is a member). The left-right cleavage was 
again observable during the debate on this law. Despite being now in opposition, the 
Conservatives voted against the introduction of the parliamentary authorization procedure for 
practical reasons of efficiency and security, but also on the grounds of principled motives that 
this law was de facto questioning the executive prerogative in foreign and defence policy 
granted by the Constitution. Conversely, IU and other regional left-wing parties presented 
amendments strengthening the parliamentary powers, such as the mention to ex-ante 
authorization and stricter reporting obligations, which were finally included in the Law 
(Congreso de los Diputados 2005; see also Xuclà 2010). 
The re-calibration of legislative-executive relations in the UK shows several 
similarities with the Spanish case.12 Most importantly, the strengthening of parliament would 
be difficult to explain without reference to the 2003 Iraq War that was unpopular at the time 
and widely perceived as a policy failure retrospectively. As in Spain, parties on the right 
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(including the majority of the opposition CP) supported the intervention. In contrast to Spain 
(and other countries), however, large parts of the Labour Party and its PM Tony Blair in 
particular, were also supportive of the intervention. Like the French President in 1991, the 
Blair (albeit reluctantly) called parliament to vote on the deployment of troops, even though 
there was no obligation to do so.   Although contestation over the royal prerogative (with no 
required approval from parliament) has a long history in the UK (Poole 2010; Joseph 2013), 
in the 20th century, no substantive vote on the use of military force was held after 1950 with 
the Korean conflict.   
Significant reconsideration of the royal prerogative was prompted by the Iraq war and 
the decision-making process leading up to the UK’s participation. Indeed, ‘Blair’s 
intransigence during 2002-2003 raised the salience of parliament’s influence over military 
action for many MPs. The more he refused even to debate the prospect of war with Iraq, the 
more they demanded not just a debate but actual influence.’ (Strong 2014: 6; see also Strong 
2015). The UK experience in Iraq cemented a growing elite consensus that parliament should 
be more involved to check the executive against unpopular, unwise, and potential illegal 
military interventions (Eyal 2008; Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017). This elite view, was promoted 
across party lines.  Both Gordon Brown (Labour) and David Cameron (CP) indicated their 
support for respective reforms, yet both refrained from real change once in office (UK 
Government 2007; Payne 2008; Strong 2014).  During both the Blair and Brown prime 
ministerships, several Labour MPs introduced bills calling to formalise the role of parliament 
in war powers, but none progressed far.13 Two inquiries by parliamentary committees on the 
recommended greater parliamentary oversight and control in decisions to deploy UK military 
(House of Commons 2004; House of Lords 2006). Conservative MPs also actively supported 
a stronger role for parliament, during the Brown government (Hansard 2007: 480).  In 2007, 
conservative MP William Hague criticized Brown’s government for lack of movement on the 
issue and introduced a parliamentary debate calling for the Iraq precedent to become a new 
norm (Strong 2014). Hague’s motion passed with cross-party support and public pledges by 
MPs to follow the ‘Iraq precedent’, but was not binding and did not legally alter the Royal 
Prerogative (Strong 2014). 
In contrast to the other three countries discussed here, the party-political cleavage on 
the question of parliament’s role in the use of military force appears relatively weak in the 
UK. Instead, there has been a cross-party momentum to strengthen parliament’s role in the 
wake of the 2003 decision to intervene in Iraq. The UK differs for two reasons. First, the 
British Labour party is more supportive of military missions than their counterparts in 
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Germany, Spain and France (see CHES data in the appendix). Second, the frustration over the 
Iraq war (under a Labour PM) has led to cross-party support for an ex-ante parliamentary vote 
(see also Kaarbo and Kenealy 2017).  
 
Continuing Recalibrations of Legislative-Executive Relations beyond the Iraq War   Unpopular	  wars	  are	  not	  the	  only	  triggers	  for	  recalibrating	  legislative-­‐executive	  relations. 
As we will show in this section, parliamentary war powers have remained contested in all four 
countries under study. In France a major recalibration took place in the context of a 
comprehensive constitutional reform. Debates in Germany, Spain and the UK revolved 
around the precise remit and status of parliamentary war powers.  
In France, a large consensus on executive leadership in foreign policy relating to the 
commitment to being a global power has survived from the period of the Cold War (cf. Cerny 
1980; Vaïsse 2009: 74ff.). What drove re-calibration in France were more general 
considerations of “modernizing” French democracy (Ostermann 2017). The 2005 
constitutional reform commission, headed by former conservative Prime Minister Edouard 
Balladur (commission Balladur),14 aimed at an overall re-evaluation of the role of parliament 
in the French polity and politics and stronger means for the control of the executive (Une Ve 
République plus démocratique 2007).15 Stating that the experience of cohabitations between 
the president(s) and an ideologically hostile government – as it had happened between the 
socialist Prime Minister Jospin and the conservative President Chirac between 1997 and 2002 
– has shown that there is not enough clarity in the distribution of tasks in the domaine réservé, 
several reforms were suggested. As to the military missions, the report recommended a more 
timid reformulation of article 35 aiming at speedy information rights for parliament and an ex-
post vote on the extension of operations after a three-month period (four months in the new 
constitution).16 Hence, the president’s right as commander-in-chief and her deriving ability 
for proactive engagement remains untouched. Nevertheless, the role of parliament in military 
operations is increased and strengthened further by the greater autonomy of parliament in its 
overall rights to call in ministers, ask questions, and determine its agenda (cf. also Blanc 
2011). The analysis suggests that the left is in favour of slightly stronger constraints and 
means of control, but importantly, the right wing of parliament started to favour increased 
means of control, too, although only those that do not limit executive room for manoeuvre. 
Hence, a party political cleavage remains. However, on the one hand, it is mitigated by a clear 
acceptance of executive lead for the sake of maintaining France’s role as a major global 
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security actor (Ostermann 2017), and on the other hand this cleavage meets a centre-left 
Socialist Party that is not principally dismissive of military missions. 
In Germany, the deployment law that entered into force in 2005, has mainly been 
challenged by politicians of the centre-right. Already in 2006, the Christian-Democratic MP 
Andreas Schockenhoff argued that the deployment law was incompatible with the concept of 
the EU Battlegroups. Schockenhoff’s call for a revision of the deployment law was seconded 
by the then Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) and Parliamentary State 
Secretary in the German Federal Ministry of Defence, Christian Schmidt (CSU) (Frankfurter 
Rundschau 2006; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007). They proposed to have the 
Bundestag approve the deployability of the German contribution to integrated forces in 
advance instead of having parliament decide on specific deployments. Social Democrats and 
Liberals immediately rebuffed this proposal. A similar proposal was made in May 2012 by 
Christian Democrats Andreas Schockenhoff and Roderich Kiesewetter (Schockenhoff and 
Kiesewetter 2012).  
Christian Democrats put this question on the agenda when they negotiated a coalition 
treaty with the Social Democrats in 2013. Given the opposition of the Social Democrats to 
any changes in the current deployment legislation, the coalition treaty stipulated the 
establishment of a commission that would assess how parliamentary rights can be safeguarded 
in the face of deepening integration within NATO and the EU (Deutschlands Zukunft 2013: 
171). The Greens and Radical Left refused to participate in the commission as they saw no 
need for any changes. The commission published its report in June 2015. It suggested a 
couple of minor revisions to the current deployment law such as exempting officers in NATO 
or EU headquarters from its remit (Deutscher Bundestag 2015). Overall, the party political 
debate in Germany over parliament’s role in decisions on the use of force fully confirms the 
expectation that demand for a strong legislature is highest amongst left parties and lowest 
amongst those of the centre-right.  
In Spain, debates on the implementation of the 2005 Organic Law of National Defence 
also indicate the enduring relevance of the party-political cleavage. The new Law did not 
specify the exact procedure of authorization (e.g. whether in committee or plenary) or 
whether the sending of additional troops, the prolongation or modification of the operation 
would also require authorisation. The usual practice has been that first-time troop dispatches 
in an operation are authorised by the plenary, whereas the authorisations of the deployment of 
additional troops are dealt by the defence committee. On the nature of the deployments, 
parliament has frequently authorized the deployment of additional troops, but not the 
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prolongation or modification of the mandate. However, this is an on-going debate and certain 
episodes have sparked controversy. For example, in March 2012 the conservative government 
did not request the authorization of Parliament for the extension of the EU naval operation 
Atalanta against piracy off the coast of Somalia, arguing that the objectives of the mission 
remained unchanged. This view was challenged by the left-wing opposition, which 
considered that the geographical extension of the operation to include the coastal territory 
implied a change in the objectives (from defensive to offensive) and new risks/consequences 
of the intervention (e.g. the growing risk of collateral damages) and therefore, parliamentary 
authorization was necessary. The Socialist group even presented a non-legislative proposal in 
early April 2012 urging the government to request the authorization, but the PP, then holding 
absolute majority in parliament, rejected it. In sum, as this case illustrates, left-wing parties 
have continued displaying a preference for a more stringent application of the parliamentary 
authorization procedure than right-wing ones. 
In the UK, Cameron’s conservative-liberal coalition government (2010-2015) 
indicated willingness to, in the words of Foreign Secretary Hague, ‘enshrine in law for the 
future the necessity of consulting parliament on military action’ (Hansard 21 March 2011: col. 
799). The conservative leader of the House of Commons also stated: ‘We will observe the 
existing convention that before UK troops are committed to conflict, the House of Commons 
should have an opportunity to debate and vote on the matter, except when there is an 
emergency’ (Hansard 31 January 2013: col. 1059).  Cameron’s decision to hold a vote on 
Libya, however, sent mixed messages since the vote occurred after UK participation in the 
airstrikes began.  Frustrated MPs secured an assurance from Hague that, in future, parliament 
would be recalled to vote prior to any deployment (Strong 2014). During 2013, as Cameron 
signalled his desire to intervene in some capacity in Syria, the issue of parliament’s role 
resurfaced. There was some confusion, however, from within the cabinet.  Although Hague 
promised that any form of intervention, even if amounting to no more than arming the Syrian 
rebels, would be subject to a parliamentary vote (The Guardian 2013), Cameron maintained 
that the government reserved the ‘ability to act very swiftly’ and without parliamentary 
approval (BBC 2013). Testifying to the House of Lords, Deputy PM Nick Clegg indicated that 
‘there was a debate within Government about how to formalise and enshrine the convention. 
He said that he was in favour of making the convention as strong and fixed as possible, but 
others were more cautious’  (House of Lords 2013). It was unclear if the debate was between 
or within parties, but given previous statements by party leaders, it was likely both. 
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Taken together, all four countries under study have experienced continued debates 
about parliament’s role in deployment decision-making. These debates have had different 
triggers, ranging from participation in an unpopular war to multinational military integration 
and constitutional reform. With the exception of the UK, however, debates in the countries 
under study all show a pronounced left/right cleavage with the left demanding or defending a 
strong parliament and the right favouring executive room of manoeuvre. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article contributes to the study of legislative-executive relations in security and defence 
policy by adding a party-political dimension to the analysis. Contrary to the widely held 
assumption in international relations literature that national interests override party political 
visions over foreign policy, our analysis shows that support for military missions 
systematically differs across political parties in Europe (for a similar finding on Japan see 
Sakaki/Lukner 2017). However, in contrast to existing studies that assume a linear correlation 
between parties’ position on a left/right scale and support for military missions, our analysis 
maintains that the relationship is curvilinear: centre-right parties are more supportive than 
centre-left parties, which in turn are more supportive than parties on the far left and the far 
right. 
By examining debates and reforms of legislative-executive relations in France, 
Germany, Spain and the UK in depth, we further demonstrate that political debates over 
parliament’s role in deployment decision-making are heavily influenced by preferences over 
substantive policy: as a general rule, parliamentary war powers have been demanded and 
defended by political parties that are rather lukewarm or sceptical about the use of armed 
forces. In contrast, parties who support military missions tend to advocate executive freedom 
and a more limited parliamentary involvement. Although the left/right cleavage in general 
extends to debates about legislative-executive relations, our analysis also shows that the terms 
of these debates differ considerably across countries. On one end of the spectrum, the German 
debate departs from a broad consensus that military missions require prior parliamentary 
approval and revolves around possible exemptions from this generally accepted rule. On the 
other end of the spectrum, the French debate discusses alternative forms of parliamentary 
involvement short of an ex-ante veto power. The debates in Spain and the UK are located 
between the French consensus about executive dominance and the German one about the 
armed forces as a ‘parliamentary army’.  
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The different terms of debate are certainly no surprise to scholars of political culture and 
national identity. Elizabeth Kier, for example, argues that ‘we cannot just assume that all left-
wing parties prefer the same policies (…) they must be understood within their cultural 
context’ (1997: 24). For example, ‘unlike some Left or Socialist Parties in Europe, the French 
Left, born in and inspired by revolution, has never been anti-militaristic or pacifistic’ (Ibid: 59 
as well as Geis et al. 2013). Students of political culture, however, will have difficulties to 
account for the significant reforms of legislative-executive relations in some of the countries 
we examined.  
The deployment of armed forces for purposes other than self-defence has been contested 
amongst political parties in European countries. Party politics is not only an essential element 
of the domestic politics of military missions but it also impacts the recalibration of legislative-
executive relations.  
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7 Then Minister of Defence Rudolf Scharping showed some sympathy for this proposal but ultimately 
endorsed the joint Socialist/Green proposal that took pride in not granting exceptions. 
8 The Lamy report contains a valuable discussion held in the defence committee, which can count as 
barometer for party positions. 
9 The government (via the Minister of Defence, Federico Trillo-Figueroa) appeared to give account of 
this decision in the defence committee only on 17 July 2003, despite the 31 requests of appearance 
that the opposition tabled since 26 March 2003. 
10	  Ley Orgánica 5/2005, de 17 de noviembre, de la Defensa Nacional, BOE no. 276, 18 de November 2005.	  
11 This prerogative has some exceptions, mainly the lack of mandatory authorisation of the missions 
directly related to the defence of Spain and the possibility to hold ex-post authorisation in case this 
was necessary for reasons of urgency (see article 17 of the Organic Law on National Defence). 
12 This section draws on Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016.  
13 The MPs Neil Gerrard, Clare Short, and Michael Meacher introduced these bills. 
14 The commission’s official name was Comité de réflexion et de proposition sur la modernisation et 
le rééquilibrage des institutions de la Ve République. 
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15 See also the Special Issue HS 2:5 (2008) on constitutional reform by the Revue française de droit 
constitutionnel.  
16  According to information obtained by the author, the four-month period has been chosen 
pragmatically in accordance with military necessities. 
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APPENDIX: PARTY FAMILIES AND SUPPORT FOR MILITARY MISSIONS 
Party Family Party Name (Vote Sharea): Support for Military Missionb 
 
Socialists  
France Germany Spain United Kingdom 
PS (26.1%): 4.1 SPD (23.5%): 5.9 PSOE (43.7%): 
6.6 
Labour (29.7%): 
7.1 
Conservatives/ 
Christian  
Democratic 
 
UMPc (40.3%) : 6.6 CDU (27.3%): 7.2 
CSU (6.5%): 7.4 
PP (40.1%): 6.1 Conservatives 
(36.1%): 6.9 
UKIP (3.1%): 4.1 
Liberals NC (1.6%) : 5 FDP (14.6%): 6.5  Lib-Dems (23%): 
5.5 
Green 
 
EELV (3.2%): 3 Die Grünen 
(10.7%): 4.1 
 Greens (1/%): 2.1 
Radical  
Left 
PCF (4.3%) : 2.7 
PRG (3.4%) : 3.6 
Die Linke 
(11.9%): 1.9 
IU (3.8%): 4.1  
Radical 
Right 
FN (4.7%) : 5 
MPF (1.2%) :4.6 
  BNP (1.9%): 5.5 
Regionalist  
Parties 
 
  CiU (3.1%): 5.7 
PNV (1.2%): 5.1 
EA (0.3%) : 5 
ERC (1.2%): 4.2 
BNG (0.8%): 4.3 
CC (0.6%): 5.5 
CHA (0.15%): 4.7 
SNP (1.7%): 4.25 
PLAID (0.6%): 
3.75 
a Vote percentage received by the party in the national elections most prior to the year of the 
survey (2010), according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trendfile. 
b Support for peace and security missions, based on CHES. 
c In a rebranding exercise, the UMP was renamed Les Républicains in May 2015. This article 
uses the former name. 
 	  
 
